In recent RBI history, some
highlights: smooth transition to Basel regulations and efficient monetary
policy under Bimal Jalan and Rangarajan, global aplomb post-recession under YV
Reddy, preventing hyperinflation by Subbarao and taming of the NPAs by Raghuram
Rajan. These achievements have put the RBI in prime position among central
banks of the world. But the utter lack of planning and monumental mismanagement
post-demonetisation by the same institution have tarnished its image.
Banking operations other than
currency operations in the country have almost come to a halt, barring
exceptions. Credit is on a downturn. All the rating agencies, including Nomura,
have down-rated the economic growth. The road to recovery sans GST is going to
be difficult.
The 59 circulars on demonetisation in
40 days reflect the lack of sensitivity in the currency management risks. The
bank’s best talent has been put to worst use and, worse still, fraudsters
raised their ugly heads in a regulatory institution known for its integrity.
The RBI may have been faulted now and then for untimely decisions or
incongruent instructions in certain areas but its integrity was never
questioned.
Disasters never come singly. There is
a disaster management manual for natural calamities like cyclones, floods,
typhoons, earthquake and droughts. Such disasters are managed after the event.
They manage us instead of us managing them. It takes a few years for the
economy to recover from a cyclone, but in the case of floods, the silt turns
the next crop a bumper one. This economic disaster of demonetisation has been
programmed to look like a flood but has turned into a cyclone.
There is no manual on risk management
for demonetisation risks. In fact, every circular/ notification/ direction
issued by the RBI is supposed to be vetted by the risk management group. But
the circulars issued post-demonetisation indicated there was no assessment of
risks. Even if the top officials of the Finance Ministry, Government of India,
or the PMO had advised a particular course of action it is the responsibility
of the RBI to stand up and explain the risks of such a decision. This did not
happen, resulting in chaos.
Had the RBI insisted on 4-day holiday
for banks instead of one day – and we had a number of such holidays when
festivals joined Saturday and Sunday -- the banks would have had time to plan
their operations. Second, the RBI releasing higher volumes of new currency to
digitised banks such as ICICI, HDFC, Axis, Stanchart, CITI and a smaller
release for retail cash-driven customer public sector banks (PSB) and smaller
private banks, speaks of the failures in currency risk management.
Some PSBs followed suit. Some bank
branches with high profile customers, who normally use internet banking for 90
percent of transactions, were doled out Rs24,000 per week while retail
customers were languishing in queues either for exchange or withdrawal, some
even losing their lives. RBI could not even question them.
Had the RBI examined the risks of release
of Rs2,000 notes it would not have done so. Second, post demonetisation when
recalibration of the ATMs was ordered, it would have done it for only lower
denominations, as ATMs are meant for short term cash requirements of people.
The limits for such withdrawals could have been restricted to Rs2,000 per
person during the first fortnight and, with improvement in new currency
inflows, it could have been raised to Rs5000. ATM operation risks were not
examined by the RBI.
The ICUs of most top corporate hospitals
are networked and can be remotely controlled. An application in US or UK or
Australia can kill an influential patient in India ICU or elsewhere and that is
the level to which disruptive technologies are traversing. After all, the
fungible money in plastic or cloud can be manoeuvred much easier.
When it comes to the question of
transforming the economy into cashless economy, RBI could have put in a white
paper on cyber risks quickly. Today, when the entire data is cloud managed, and
when the more digitised economies like the US are turning to cash economy as a
safer mode, RBI could have mapped the risks of each digitised instrument and
prepared the models that would suit the digitised Indian economy. It should
have given the road map for a less cash economy even before the Prime Minister
latched up to the idea.
The charm of mobile smart phone
dishing out cash in air for a 47% illiterate economy holds immense possibility
of easy theft/misuse/abuse of M-Pin or password to such of them. The economy
has seen new currency of Rs2,000 in billions caught in seizures within a month
after its release. Is it difficult for such persons to penetrate the plastic
economy? The growing cybercrime rate clearly indicates imminent disaster.
For proper foresight, hindsight is
important. Reversing the damage done to the stables of RBI needs a dedicated
team and the ability to listen to its sound advice, sooner than later. History
would never excuse the present Governor of RBI for his leadership failure of a
phenomenal magnitude.
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