Thursday, December 19, 2019

Enhancing Competitiveness of MSMEs in Slowdown


Strategies for enhancing Competitiveness of Manufacturing MSMEs:

Muted manufacturing with PMI just around 51, a fall from about 54 almost couple of years back, increasing protectionism of the US, UK with the BREXIT winning a thumping majority for Boric Johnson and global trade winds heading to recession have taken the toll of India’s growth story. Industry would face more challenging times than before due not merely to adverse headwinds on external trade but the turbulence in the domestic economy. Enhancing competitiveness for manufacturing firms in the small sector has several challenges and these can turn into opportunities for growth.

Inefficiency, increasing fraud rates and faulty Bank Balance sheets of almost all the major Banks in India compounded the woes of domestic debt markets. No surprise that the equity suppliers like the VCs and Angel Funds are distancing themselves. The impact is the most on the vulnerable – MSMEs, particularly in the manufacturing segment. The thriving or successful even in this current environment are those SMEs in the Defense, Aerospace, Gems & Jewelry, pharmaceuticals and a few agro-industries linked to market giants like the ITC.

Nobody can have a guess of how many MSMEs shut their shops due to the Banks’ unwillingness to revive despite the RBI and GoI instructions as no ‘exit’ statistics are captured. The corporate sector exits alone show up in the data because the Ministry of Corporate Sector statutorily demands it and IBC has become a barometer for industry and financial institutions’ health.

Banks never gave data on number of units financed or closed but only number of accounts. Each unit can have number of accounts: term loans for specified purposes; working capital – cash credit, overdraft, SME Plus, etc., and unfunded limits like LCs, Guarantees etc.

Since 98 percent of the MSMEs are either partnerships or proprietary and are linked to onetime registration on Udyog Aadhar, there is no way the closed shutters get into the data. Even the industry and trade associations do not get a wind of the closures as several so-called members are irregular in the payment of membership subscription annually.

This scenario leaves the policy maker to public noise and a wild hunch. Every State is concerned about improving the ecosystem for the MSME sector and more in conjunction with the Union Government. States do know that a robust MSME sector is a red carpet for the global investors. However, improving the MSME competitiveness remains the biggest challenge and it requires a more holistic approach than now.

Information asymmetry and adverse selection continue to be the biggest blocks for institutional interventions, both financial and non-financial. Several MSMEs complain of a serious setback due to demonetization and GST. The reasons for such a far cry should be seen in the advantages they got without them: cash sales not routed through the bank accounts and yet several MSEs thrived until their debtors ditched them; inventories over-invoiced could get into the recorded working capital cycle with banks as the banks have been going by what is shown to them instead of what they should see and count for want of field visits; there have been many qualified ‘account experts’ to show the convenient excel spread sheets for securing working capital limits from banks; the small volumes these enterprises produce and the small size of the firms have also distanced them from the reach to markets; and there have been very few mentors and counsellors to advise responsibly either from the financial institutions or others to advise the units right financial discipline would get them all the gains they are looking for as also their entry to new markets.

GoI on its part, unleashed MUDRA, SME99Minute Loans and whipped up the Shamiana Camps that could give the lever to the FM to announce that the Banks sanctioned 8lakh loans amounting to Rs.70000cr in just two months, which they could not do for years!! Future NPAs would show the unknowns and unseen among such crowd. Dy. Governor, RBI recently sounded the alarm on the growing MUDRA account NPAs.

MSMEs on their part should earn their right to grow by following best accounting practices. Working capital management basically rests on four important factors:
       Predictability of Cycle
       Material flows
       Receivable – overdue
       Independent Credit rating agencies’ assessments.

Some more essentials are set out below:
(i) Realistic Assessment of Morale Building Assurances: MSMEs would be well advised to cautiously assess morale building assurances during the current slowdown of the economy. MSMEs which accepted such assurances in the backdrop of global recession of 2008 and built up capacities and kept up production levels, resulting in very high inventories, were devastated. Furthermore, when demand for a product falls, there could be pressures on small enterprises not to cut output as this would eventually result in labour lay- offs. Units that accepted such suasion faced disastrous outcomes.

(ii) Capacity Expansion: Quite often, MSMEs come to the erroneous conclusion that their product would experience an unrealistically high increase in demand. Units which build up capacities on tenuous information invariably end up with serious problems. In a savagely competitive environment, it is these small units that end up in ‘fire sales’ which are available to buyers at attractive prices. There is merit in building up financial resources to avail of such opportunities rather than increasing the capacity of their existing units. It is time to realize that coopetition would bring better synergies among similar producers to meet up with temporary surge in demand.

(iii) Interest Rate Cycles and Excessive Dependence on Bank Credit: During the expansionary phase of the credit cycle, banks are only too willing to lend but during the downturn small borrowers are invariably the first casualties in being denied additional credit. As an abundantly prudent measure, MSMEs are well advised to seek bank credit essentially for inventory financing but be very cautious when using bank finance for capital expenditure. Excessive borrowing for capital expenditure generally puts MSMEs in to distress during cyclical movements in the economy. It is good to learn to build equity gradually from out of the revenues and avoid excess leverage. They should learn to conform to financial discipline when alone they will win the trust of investors. Strategic partnerships are best bet in times of stress and not overindulging in debt. It is good news for the MSMEs that Government of India has extended the Interest Subvention Scheme up to March 2021.

(iv) Importance of an Appropriate Exchange Rate: MSMEs account for about 40 per cent of exports. It is unfortunate that there is a widely held perception that a strong rupee exchange rate reflects good macroeconomic management. This is clearly erroneous. Large industry is generally import intensive while small industry is export intensive. Hence a strong exchange rate of the rupee (i.e. an overvalued rupee) helps large industry and hurts MSMEs. It is not as if the exchange rate should be excessively undervalued. As a rule of thumb, over the medium/long-term, the nominal exchange rate of the rupee vis-à-vis the major industrial country currencies, should be adjusted downward based on the inflation rate differentials between India and the major industrial countries. An overvalued exchange rate makes MSMEs uncompetitive in international markets. MSMEs should not attempt to be forex traders; they should concentrate on their own line of production.

As a staunch optimist and believer in the excellent capabilities of MSMEs in innovation, incubation and future growth, least expensive handholding, mentoring and counselling as process consulting tools have immense scope to become highly competitive both domestically and globally if certain synergies are built into the system. Telangana Industrial Health Clinic Ltd has adequate capabilities in this exclusive portfolio of handholding, mentoring and counseling as a preventive and stress relieving measure.

Supply Chain to Value Chain:
There is need for building ‘pools’ or aggregators to gain both cost advantage and brand image through co-branding of products.

India Mart are trying to do supply chain aggregation. MSME online Bangalore is also trying to evolve an ecosystem where a lot of questions of MSME are getting answered by about 50 consultants and they have started CEO Club for taking MSME entrepreneurs to next level by having a monthly meeting. Jeevan is trying to develop a 360' view for developing the ecosystem in Hyderabad on Hub and Scope model. These are welcome initiatives, no doubt. They need traction.
Many of the user population should not merely know such initiatives but should also know how best to access them. Second, by aggregators, I mean those that are fully capable of building a common brand for a set of products from the micro and small manufacturing enterprises through building also their capacities and capabilities to rise above their existing levels, introduce those practices and technologies that make them closer to the global standards even if sold in domestic markets and secure price at their doorstep within the promised wait-in period. These would mean investment on the part of aggregator and a price that the aggregator should legitimately get for such services without losing the competitiveness in the market. Ipso facto, it would mean that at the firm level, cost reduction should take place at each link in the value chain. There are different ways of doing it.

The Industry Associations can develop a Marketing Arm and establish net linkages with e-commerce players; 2. they can help the industry avail the host of incentives waiting to be used from the GoI-MSME schemes; 3. they can establish linkage with NSIC, MSME-DI and such other institutions. 
MSMEs should earn their right to grow. This happens only when they are quality conscious where precision, functionality and producing premium products will be their driving forces. Their passion and pride rest on satisfied customer. Intellectual property rights, improved technology processes and getting equity to fund such technologies are all their sustainable future. Employee retention strategies depend not just on higher remuneration but on building trust and social cohesion as also gender equity.

MSMEs should also realize that death is a process of development. They must know when to exit from the enterprise and how. Strategies to clear sovereign dues and realization of overdue creditors on a mission mode pre-exit have a clear role. Ignoring them will be suicidal.

*Author of ‘The Story of Indian MSMEs: Despair to Dawn of Hope’ (2019) is an economist and Adviser, Government of Telangana, Telangana Industrial Health Clinic Ltd., Hyderabad (www.yerramraju1.com)



Tuesday, December 3, 2019

What went wrong with Mudra Loans?



Speed Thrills but Kills Too – A Story of Mudra Loans
B. Yerram Raju* & J. Sitapati Sarma**

The concerns on rising NPAs in Mudra Loans are red flagged by the Regulator starting from Shri Raghuram Rajan, followed by current Governor Shri Shaktikant Das and Dy Governor of RBI.   This only manifests the seriousness of the issue. 

The NPAs in Mudra saw a steep jump of 126% in one year – increased from Rs. 7227crore in FY 18 to Rs. 16481 crore in FY 19 with number of infected accounts totaling to 30.57 lakh. India Ratings and ICRA estimated NPAs under MUDRA between 10-15% as compared to 5.39% in March 2018.  Since the Mallya debacle, surging corporate NPAs are now in the company of their less endowed MUDRA borrowers pepped up by the Government.  Economy slowdown should have nothing to contribute to this sordid story.

What went wrong with Mudra Loans? 

Ever since the scheme has been flagged off in April 2015, the targets were not only set but closely driven breathing over the necks of the banks by the Ministry of Finance, to impress the importance attached to the scheme.  Bankers have exhibited more than required enthusiasm and competed with one another  to  achieve  targets to dwarf the peers before the Delhi bosses. 

While massive numbers are to be achieved within set deadlines, it appears that the appraisal was given a go by as hinted by the Deputy Governor urging banks to monitor repayment capacity of borrowers before disbursement.  All the targets – increased year after year - were achieved by not only PSBs but other participants too. 

The total sanctions till March 2019 since inception stood at Rs. 8.92 lakh crores.   The speed at which these loans are sanctioned can be noticed from the fact that Rs.18000 crore worth sanctions were pushed during the last 8 days of FY19 to achieve the target.  During FY19 an amount of Rs.970 crore was sanctioned per day by all Mudra Lending Institutions together. 

Coverage of these loans under Credit Guarantee Fund for Micro Units (CGFMU) up to Rs.10 lakh could be another reason for sloppy appraisal It is amply clear that these are push loans without proper appraisal and due diligence of the borrower.  Informed sources say that bankers chose this route to ‘evergreen’ their small ticket loans!  

The numbers reveal some different facts.  Of the total sanctions, the new loan sanctions hovered around 26% barring the first year of introduction where it stood at 36%.  Can we draw a conclusion that the renewals/existing loans accounted for larger share probably owing to evergreening process of existing loans with increased limits?  More than 70% of the loans are sanctioned under “shishu’ (Not exceeding Rs.50000), considered least risky in the portfolio. 

While Banks can finance up to Rs.10 lacs under the scheme, they preferred to keep the average ticket size to less than Rs. 1 lac.  To be more precise, the average ticket size of mudra loan increased from Rs.39405 in FY16 to Rs.52739 in FY18.  Statewise disbursals also indicate unequal distribution that also needs correction.

One way it is blessing in disguise; otherwise, the slippages and NPA accretion could have been higher.  But the only issue that remains in such small ticket loans is the adequacy of finance and resultant viability.   

During the current fiscal 29 million loans were disbursed amounting to Rs. 1.41 trillion, showing slight slowing down, against Rs. 3 trillion in the previous fiscal. Not even 2% has been sanctioned to the manufacturing enterprises because that involves onsite verification and follow up.  

The positive part of the story is employment creation.   As per an unpublished survey a total of 11.2 million new jobs were created in 2015-18, of which 5.1 million were new entrepreneurs.   If government were not to push for targets, Banks would not have touched these clienteles with a barge pole. It is however doubtful whether banks given a free hand would improve the quality of portfolio as everywhere else they had the free hand too, NPAs are surging ahead. Banks’ eye on quality has much to do with their knowledge, skills and attitude. All the three seem to be at low ebb.

Jandhan accompanied by savings and insurance and MUDRA led by credit with refinance and guarantee are two schemes of the most acclaimed inclusive agenda of NDA government. MFIs, Small Finance Banks also lent heavily along with PSBs in MUDRA realized that they did not have much to loose as the money to lend came from refinance window while post disbursement losses are guaranteed. Since the funds to MUDRA are from the Union Budget, the losses arising from the scheme devolve on the taxpayer.

RBI would do well to commission a detailed study of the portfolio and take corrective measures to ensure that the inclusive agenda of the government would not get undermined and the taxpayer is saved of the undue burden of the scheme.

Yerram Raju is an economist and risk management specialist and Sitapati Sarma is retired General Manager of SBI and present Chief Operating Officer of Telangana Industrial Health Clinic Ltd. The views are personal.
Published in Money Life on 2,12,2019 www.moneylife.in

Saturday, November 30, 2019

Rating the Ratings is imperative


CREDIT RATING – YET AGAIN ON THE BENDING MAT



It is three decades since CIBIL rating has commenced its operations and a decade since Brickworks has started. We also see the frequent sovereign ratings of Standard and Poor, Ind-Ra (Fisch) and Moody’s. Very recently, Nirmala Sitaraman, in the wake of serial failure of well rated corporates – eg., DHFL, IL&FS, and several other PSUs as well as Private Companies, mentioned her serious concern. Sovereign ratings are also not infallible. This article would like to see the present status and suggest the modifications.


“A credit rating is technically an opinion on the relative degree of risk associated with timely payment of interest and principal on a debt instrument. It is an informed indication of the likelihood of default of an issuer on a debt instrument, relative to the respective likelihoods of default of other issuers in the market. It is therefore an independent, easy-to-use measure of relative credit risk.”[i]

If a bank chooses to keep some of its loans unrated, it may have to provide, as per extant RBI instructions, a risk weight of 100 per cent for credit risk on such loans. Basel regulations provide for supervisors increasing the standard risk weight for unrated claims where a higher risk weight is warranted by the overall default experience in their jurisdiction. Further, as part of the supervisory review process, the supervisor may also consider whether the credit quality of corporate claims held by individual banks should warrant a standard risk weight higher than 100%.

The working of the entire rating system was questioned after the sub-prime crisis resulted in collapse of not just Fennie May and Freddie Mac but even UBS Credit Suisse, Citi group, Deutsche Bank etc. This led the US Fed and the Wall Street to revamp the entire rating mechanism after a careful study of the processes they followed and the measurement they gave to different parameters. But such changes are not followed uniformly across nations.

Theoretically, internal credit scoring models are effective instruments for the banks in loan origination, loan pricing and loan monitoring.  But the banks’ rating architecture is different from the rating agencies and this is one of the reasons for the regulator to insist on a rating review mechanism to be part of the Banks’ Credit Risk Management Committee. 

The rating process involves assessment of Business Risk arising from interplay of five factors: industry risk; market position, operating efficiency, financial risk and management risk. While industry risk and market position can be assessed from the macro level data, operating efficiency and management risk can be captured by observation, frequent interaction and experience. Unless cross functional, sectoral, trade data from all sources is available on digital platform and that too verifiable easily, the rating agencies are bound to err.

As per Basel II (2000): “An Internal Rating refers to a summary indicator of risk inherent in an individual credit. Ratings typically embody an assessment of the risk of loss due to failure by given borrower to pay as promised, based on consideration of relevant counter party and facility characteristics.  A rating system includes the conceptual methodology, management processes and systems that play a role in the assignment of a rating.”  Understandably, there was a collapse of the rating instrumentality looking at the collapse of the corporate credit and investments almost without notice. 

One of the common failings noticed by informed circles, for example, has been, a firm that owes to MSMEs beyond Rs.2lakhs should have been rated lower than those that would have paid promptly. Most corporates both PSUs and Private Companies were chronic defaulters and this came to surface more prominently in all the NCLT-dealt with cases. Second, poor governance should have got bad rating. Including Banks, PSUs and Private Companies fare badly and yet got good ratings!!

Ever since the Rating is mandated by the RBI while extending credit, we have seen phenomenal failures in the well-rated corporates both in the private and public sectors, e.g., DHFL, IL&FS. SMEs have no option but to get the rating of one or the other agency and yet, the Bank concerned would have its own rating that would decide the quantum of credit.

Measuring policy risks, sovereign risks and governance risks is the major challenge and this challenge has become visible in the recent corporate rating failures. Banks severely compromised by pitching high on CIBIL ratings and particularly, the individuals and Directors of the Companies. The thirty-year old CIBIL needs to amend its ways if the ratings book should be cleaned.

Technology disruption, easy regulations governing payment platforms, data on merchant performance, changes in consumption patterns, differential product regulations across the nations for similarly placed products and increasing protectionism are all the new risk areas for capture by the CRAs.

In so far as Indian financial sector is concerned, consolidation following the merger of PSBs, failure of NBFCs, Urban Cooperative Banks, and the lackluster performance of the MFIs, metrocentric banking are all new challenges to the CRAs. Telecom regulations and their interface with the payment and settlement systems, Internet of Things, Blockchain technologies are the new disruptors and even moderate margin of error can impact heavily and the rating can collapse. Further, product regulations have also become dynamic. In a way, all these aspects seem to have their shadow cast on the rating instrumentality as a risk mitigant.

There is therefore an imminent need for a High Level Committee of the SEBI, RBI, PFRDA, IRDA, and Telecom Regulatory Authority to examine the methodologies of CRAs for a more reliable rating process and pricing of rating agencies.


*Dr. B. Yerram Raju is an economist and risk management specialist and can be reached at yerramr@gmail.com Also see my blog on the subject June 11, 2011
Published in the Money Life on 28.11.19



























[i] Report of the Committee on Comprehensive Regulation for Credit Rating Agencies, Ministry of Finance, Corporate Affairs Division, December 2009