Showing posts with label commercial banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label commercial banks. Show all posts

Thursday, April 21, 2022

 Cumbersome Guarantees and Insurances for MSEs Need Redress

This Blog was published in the Times of India ( see the link below)

Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) are extolled as the engines of employment, growth, and key to the supply chain management of medium and large corporate enterprises, leading exporters, manufacture over 6000 products. They have been redefined during the first Covid-19 disruptions to the economy in terms of investment and turnover, replacing the earlier definition restricted to investment in plants and machinery. This sector is next to agriculture which employs the largest number of persons. 98% of enterprises are micro, mostly owned by proprietors or partners. Even partnerships are to a large extent family partners.

Access to credit for the sector is the Achilles Heel. To provide easy and better access the GoI and SIDBI have set up Credit Guarantee Trust for Micro and Small Enterprises in 2000 (CGTMSE). Even during the pandemic, GoI introduced Emergency Credit Linked Guarantee Scheme under Atma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyan with CGTMSE holding the baby.

But did the sector gain much from the insurances and guarantees in their existing shape? This needs a probe.

Insurance:

When the small-scale industries of Yester decades used to take out insurance cover for the plant and machinery against fire, riot, and risks, through the liability jointly owned by both the credit institution and the borrowing enterprise. After universal banking was ushered in, several banks took to Bank Assurance. A transparent joint insurance policy gave place to a policy that just lists the names of the borrowing MSME firms with the amount insured. The firms are ignorant of their liability under such policy and its renewal terms annually.

There is no evidence of any insurance claim of such bank insurance of enterprise machinery as a primary asset response. On the other hand, as several MSMEs noted that banks have over-booked insurance premium amount upfront with every loan sanction – whether term loan or working capital. Never did such insurance pay off for the MSE in trouble.

Both the MSMEs and the Banks have debated their mutual deficiencies in several media discussions, and they are plagued by mutual distrust.

While the redefinition helped many scale up their enterprises and move to exports quickly, there were lakhs that shut their doors during the pandemic. The impact of redefining has been such that a negative 1.8% MSE outstanding loan in FY20 has moved to 4.8% year-on-year by the third quarter as the existing.

Guarantees:

The 'strength' of a guarantee that allows credit to the enterprises without collateral or third party, is context-dependent: it depends on its nature, the legal environments that are relevant, current practices, and the context when the lender exercises his right. Yet, for twenty years, institutional credit to the sector leaves a gaping hole of Rs.279 trillion according to the International Financial Corporation (2015) study.

RBI mandated Banks to extend credit to micro-enterprises under CGTMSE up to Rs.10lakhs per enterprise. While the CGTMSE can extend guarantees to MSEs up to Rs.2crore, the covers range from 75 to 85 percent of the loans. During the last three years (2018-21), even retail loans and the service sector are being covered with guarantees while the extent of such guarantees is limited to 50% of retail loans. One hundred Member-Lending institutions (MLIs) that include 23 NBFCs are availing of the facility and yet several of them express serious reservations over such ailment.

Annual Report of CGTMSE for Fy2021 reveals that 47 percent of guarantees pertained to loan amounts of less than Rs.10lakhs (mandated by the RBI to extend without any collateral); 18% are in the range of loan amount of Rs.10lakhs-25lakhs; 14% are in the range of Rs.25lakhs-50lakhs; 12% are in the range of Rs.50lakhs-100lakhs, and 9% are in the range of Rs.100lakhs-200lakhs. Rs.45,851crore have been provided guarantee cover during the year 2020-21.

MLI concerns:

The guarantee portfolio increased after the retail, hybrid-collateral, and NBFCs joined, as these three constituted 49% of the guarantees extended during FY 21. It is the 1.18crore of the 6.3crore MSMEs that need a guarantee more than the rest. MLIs opine that the guarantee premium of 1-1.25 percent involved a lot of paperwork, follow-up for receiving the claim amount that too, after declaring the asset as NPA.

Banks have to prove that they have taken all the measures that include issuing legal notices, follow-up on recovery, provisioning for the loans, and proceeding against the borrowers under SARFAESI Act where the assets are partially guaranteed. These factors lead to a lack of trust by the CGTMSE both the MSEs and Banks.

The Way Forward

MSEs in manufacturing that forms an important component of sustainable supply chain management of Industry 4.0 need different forms of credit acceleration and insurance mechanism.

While the Banks should evaluate the credit risks of such enterprises on transparent parameters and extend credit to MSEs along with counseling, mentoring, and follow-up, the enterprises should digitize their operations and derive benefits from a large number of schemes recently floated by the Ministry of MSME, GoI.

Since fourteen states take 88 percent of MSE outstanding credit, and these MSEs reported less NPAs than their elder brothers in the corporate sector, each enterprise can be insured for various risks that include, fire, riot risks, natural calamities, the pandemic-like situations, plant and machinery, storage, other supply-chain disruptions, and cash flows on a graded scale. Once the enterprise pays the premium based on the risk it chooses to cover, and such risks are well-measured, insurance will ensure that the enterprise will be a going concern, and banks can extend the needed help duly assessing their risk cover as well. It is time for a change the guarantee is looked at and replaced it with Insurance, for which purpose, the GoI may appoint a High-powered Committee.

The policy should be transparent and discussed with the stakeholders in at least ten of the fourteen MSME-dominant states before introduction.


https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/fincorp/cumbersome-guarantees-and-insurances-for-mses-need-redress/

 

 

Saturday, November 30, 2019

Rating the Ratings is imperative


CREDIT RATING – YET AGAIN ON THE BENDING MAT



It is three decades since CIBIL rating has commenced its operations and a decade since Brickworks has started. We also see the frequent sovereign ratings of Standard and Poor, Ind-Ra (Fisch) and Moody’s. Very recently, Nirmala Sitaraman, in the wake of serial failure of well rated corporates – eg., DHFL, IL&FS, and several other PSUs as well as Private Companies, mentioned her serious concern. Sovereign ratings are also not infallible. This article would like to see the present status and suggest the modifications.


“A credit rating is technically an opinion on the relative degree of risk associated with timely payment of interest and principal on a debt instrument. It is an informed indication of the likelihood of default of an issuer on a debt instrument, relative to the respective likelihoods of default of other issuers in the market. It is therefore an independent, easy-to-use measure of relative credit risk.”[i]

If a bank chooses to keep some of its loans unrated, it may have to provide, as per extant RBI instructions, a risk weight of 100 per cent for credit risk on such loans. Basel regulations provide for supervisors increasing the standard risk weight for unrated claims where a higher risk weight is warranted by the overall default experience in their jurisdiction. Further, as part of the supervisory review process, the supervisor may also consider whether the credit quality of corporate claims held by individual banks should warrant a standard risk weight higher than 100%.

The working of the entire rating system was questioned after the sub-prime crisis resulted in collapse of not just Fennie May and Freddie Mac but even UBS Credit Suisse, Citi group, Deutsche Bank etc. This led the US Fed and the Wall Street to revamp the entire rating mechanism after a careful study of the processes they followed and the measurement they gave to different parameters. But such changes are not followed uniformly across nations.

Theoretically, internal credit scoring models are effective instruments for the banks in loan origination, loan pricing and loan monitoring.  But the banks’ rating architecture is different from the rating agencies and this is one of the reasons for the regulator to insist on a rating review mechanism to be part of the Banks’ Credit Risk Management Committee. 

The rating process involves assessment of Business Risk arising from interplay of five factors: industry risk; market position, operating efficiency, financial risk and management risk. While industry risk and market position can be assessed from the macro level data, operating efficiency and management risk can be captured by observation, frequent interaction and experience. Unless cross functional, sectoral, trade data from all sources is available on digital platform and that too verifiable easily, the rating agencies are bound to err.

As per Basel II (2000): “An Internal Rating refers to a summary indicator of risk inherent in an individual credit. Ratings typically embody an assessment of the risk of loss due to failure by given borrower to pay as promised, based on consideration of relevant counter party and facility characteristics.  A rating system includes the conceptual methodology, management processes and systems that play a role in the assignment of a rating.”  Understandably, there was a collapse of the rating instrumentality looking at the collapse of the corporate credit and investments almost without notice. 

One of the common failings noticed by informed circles, for example, has been, a firm that owes to MSMEs beyond Rs.2lakhs should have been rated lower than those that would have paid promptly. Most corporates both PSUs and Private Companies were chronic defaulters and this came to surface more prominently in all the NCLT-dealt with cases. Second, poor governance should have got bad rating. Including Banks, PSUs and Private Companies fare badly and yet got good ratings!!

Ever since the Rating is mandated by the RBI while extending credit, we have seen phenomenal failures in the well-rated corporates both in the private and public sectors, e.g., DHFL, IL&FS. SMEs have no option but to get the rating of one or the other agency and yet, the Bank concerned would have its own rating that would decide the quantum of credit.

Measuring policy risks, sovereign risks and governance risks is the major challenge and this challenge has become visible in the recent corporate rating failures. Banks severely compromised by pitching high on CIBIL ratings and particularly, the individuals and Directors of the Companies. The thirty-year old CIBIL needs to amend its ways if the ratings book should be cleaned.

Technology disruption, easy regulations governing payment platforms, data on merchant performance, changes in consumption patterns, differential product regulations across the nations for similarly placed products and increasing protectionism are all the new risk areas for capture by the CRAs.

In so far as Indian financial sector is concerned, consolidation following the merger of PSBs, failure of NBFCs, Urban Cooperative Banks, and the lackluster performance of the MFIs, metrocentric banking are all new challenges to the CRAs. Telecom regulations and their interface with the payment and settlement systems, Internet of Things, Blockchain technologies are the new disruptors and even moderate margin of error can impact heavily and the rating can collapse. Further, product regulations have also become dynamic. In a way, all these aspects seem to have their shadow cast on the rating instrumentality as a risk mitigant.

There is therefore an imminent need for a High Level Committee of the SEBI, RBI, PFRDA, IRDA, and Telecom Regulatory Authority to examine the methodologies of CRAs for a more reliable rating process and pricing of rating agencies.


*Dr. B. Yerram Raju is an economist and risk management specialist and can be reached at yerramr@gmail.com Also see my blog on the subject June 11, 2011
Published in the Money Life on 28.11.19



























[i] Report of the Committee on Comprehensive Regulation for Credit Rating Agencies, Ministry of Finance, Corporate Affairs Division, December 2009

Tuesday, October 1, 2019

Risk Management in Indian Banks and FIs need Improvement



The scale of frauds across the Banks in India, from cooperative banks to commercial banks crossing half a trillion rupees, ballooning NPAs, slow and untimely resolve of bankruptcy cases have exacerbated the credit and operational risks. Finance specialists add to them the impending climate risks.

The PMC Urban Bank is just the tip of the iceberg viewing from regulatory perspective. Lack of oversight is clearly visible. Appointment of Directors failed to honor the ‘fit and proper criteria’. IL&FS and DHL in NBFC space shook up the shadow banking as well. This situation raises more questions than answers and require a firm resolve to warding off financial risks sooner than later, much before they translate into macro-economic risks.

Post-recession (2008), when the regulators hurried to drive risk management and governance of risks relied on Basel Committee. The industry’s new-found focus on risk management was ‘driven largely by a survival mentality and regulatory requirements’, as pointed out by Clifford Rossi and not by internalizing the risk assessment processes and governance improvements.

Rating institutions gave exemplary ratings and yet there was collapse of corporate credit. Risk management committees were set up and Chief Risk Officers were appointed and yet the risk mitigation did not take place. Both the government – the owner of the largest banking space and the Banks do not speak of risk management as a factor that led to the recent surge in frauds. Every product and process in these institutions is put for risk assessment.

New schemes and new programs do not get assessed for all the risks. Institutional failure to unlearn from the past and complacence on the part of Banks and FIs would appear to be the main reason for the current imbroglio. Time is not unripe for a 3600 thinking on the subject to put in place a mechanism for risk management and governance.  Noticeably, it is the absence of risk culture that is to blame for the absence of risk governance, process, analytics and expertise.

Banks sit on a mountain of data and claim AI and MML are receiving their immediate attention. The questions that come to my mind are: why then the Banks and FIs are unable to put in place a risk-based pricing system for all their loan products? How is it they fund start ups in manufacturing and services at the same level of interest rates? Again, why an owner-driven or proprietary or partnership micro and small enterprise and a medium enterprise driven by a Board with competent directors are also charged the same price? Why the Banks that claim latest technologies in place failed to transmit the rate cuts of the regulator to the clients requiring a mandatory compliance to pare the rates of interest with the Repo rate?

First and foremost for correction, is the tacit acceptance of failure of governance unabashedly and move to a thorough clean up. The four regulatory institutions – RBI, SEBI, IRDA, PFRDA should sit together and review the rating processes of all the Rating institutions they approved. Rating should not lead to a regulatory arbitrage. A simple uncompiled directive like the corporate institutions should reflect the dues beyond Rs.2lakh per vendor MSMEs did not reduce the rating of many a corporate. Had this been done, many MSMEs would not have become NPAs. There would not have been any need for the FM to give specific mandates to clear the dues to MSMEs before October 15, 2019.
Institutions that are adept at rating corporates have a myopic view of MSMEs and such thinking is largely driven by false risk perception driven by the lenders! Watch out the data – micro and small enterprises constitute around 8% of the credit to them as NPAs and every NPA is not unrecoverable. Rating is also influenced by the collateral rather than the enterprise, entrepreneur and environment over which the Banks have data but with no required behavioral analytics.

I agree with Clifford Ross, the leading risk professional when he says: “Risk professionals need to use disruptive technologies and perhaps find other tools to more effectively assess non-financial risks (e.g., cyber and operational), which have grown substantially over the past five years.

For both financial and non-financial risks, the continued development of risk expertise is vital. A great risk professional possesses the following qualities: (1) a balanced and logical temperament; (2) experience, over-the-cycle; (3) critical thinking; (4) analytical leanings; and (5) an action-driven mindset. What's more, on-the-job training is essential, because we are all at least accidental risk managers.”
*The author of ‘Risk Management – The New Accelerator’, economist and risk management specialist. Can be reached through www.yerramraju1.com




Tuesday, November 15, 2016

How Demonetisation affected rural areas

How Demonetisation affected rural areas

By any standards and by all means demonetisation of 86% Indian Currency that affects the valets of 1250mn population is no ordinary decision. Union Government sent shock waves among not just the hoarders of unaccounted money but also among the state governments and the huge political constituency. The measure may have precedence but the dimension of the effect has no precedence and therefore, economic historians are watching in gaze for generating a new script.

Cash is dirty; banks keep Dettol or soap for their staff handling cash to wash off their hands because of the bacteria that causes pneumonia, or viruses or skin infections. Yet we would love to hold them. Most drug dealers, casinos or prostitutes or casual farm workers prefer to receive cash for they only receive small remunerations for their day’s labour or night’s pleasure. Under-ground economy does not stop these few known. Waste and scrap dealers, many steel merchants join the gang.

Tuesday, June 9, 2015

Can Gold Monetisation Scheme succeed?

Gold Monetisation Scheme:

Some Suggestions:
I used to have my batch mate in the SBI, retired as MD of an Associate Bank, who used to buy Rs.100 worth of gold every month during his first ten years of service. Later, he may have increased it to Rs.500 or even Rs.1000 a month. Such is the urge for having gold in domestic vaults in India. South India or people from the South in the North invariably have gold in the shape of jewelery. Every village household, how so ever small it may be, has at least 500-1000gms of gold in the shape of jewelery. There are certain traditionally rich families where every day in a week has certain set of jewelery to wear for the house wife inherited from the mother in law. Such ornaments are at least 20-30kgs. These are invariably kept in the lockers and taken out for the festivals. This is a huge idle gold reserve in jewelry.